Wilfrid Laurier University

Scholars Commons @ Laurier
Southern African Migration Programme

Reports and Papers

2006

No. 43: Migration and Development in Mozambique: Poverty,
Inequality and Survival
Fion de Vletter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/samp
Part of the African Studies Commons, Economics Commons, and the Migration Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
De Vletter, F. (2006). Migration and Development in Mozambique: Poverty, Inequality and Survival (rep., pp.
i-33). Waterloo, ON: Southern African Migration Programme. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 43.

This Migration Policy Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Reports and Papers at Scholars
Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Southern African Migration Programme by an authorized
administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROJECT
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT
IN MOZAMBIQUE :
POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND
SURVIVAL

MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 43
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk

MIGRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN
MOZAMBIQUE :
POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND
SURVIVAL

FION DE VLETTER

SERIES EDITOR:
PROF. JONATHAN C RUSH

SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROJECT
2006

Published by Idasa, 6 Spin Street, Church Square, Cape Town, 8001, and Southern
African Research Centre, Queen’s University, Canada.
Copyright Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) 2006
ISBN 1-920118-10-1
First published 2006
Design by Bronwen Müller
Typeset in Goudy

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, without prior permission from the publishers.
Bound and printed by Logo Print, Cape Town

C ONTENTS

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1

INTRODUCTION

3

METHODOLOGY

4

ANE/AUSTRAL SURVEY

OF

RURAL HOUSEHOLDS (1999-2001)

4

SAMP MIGRATION AND REMITTANCE S URVEY (2004)

5

SAMP SURVEY OF MOZAMBICAN MINERS (1996)

5

WAGE EMPLOYMENT

AND

MIGRATION PATTERNS IN R URAL MOZAMBIQUE

MIGRATION AND HOUSEHOLD W EALTH PATTERNS

5
8

REMITTANCES AND POVERTY IN THE SOUTH

14

HOUSEHOLD DIFFERENTIATION

23

C ONCLUSION

26

ENDNOTES

30

MIGRATION POLICY SERIES

32

TABLES

PAGE

TABLE 1 I NDICATORS OF LIVING C ONDITIONS

10

TABLE 2 DISTRIBUTION

10

OF C ULTIVATED

FIELDS BY SIZE

TABLE 3 F ARMING P RACTICES

10

TABLE 4 H OUSEHOLDS GROWING AND SELLING SELECTED C ROPS

11

TABLE 5 OWNERSHIP LIVESTOCK

12

TABLE 6 SELECTED I NANIMATE ASSET HOLDINGS

13

TABLE 7 I NVESTMENTS ( ABOVE 500,000 MT) MADE
% OF HOUSEHOLDS

IN LAST YEAR

13

TABLE 8 DISTRIBUTION OF W EALTH POINTS BY REGION (%)

14

TABLE 9 HOUSEHOLD

16

INCOME FROM ALL SOURCES (BY FREQUENCY)

TABLE 10 H OUSEHOLD I NCOME BY SOURCE AND VALUE

16

TABLE 11 F REQUENCY AND VALUE OF MONEY REMITTANCES

17

TABLE 12 S ECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXTERNAL MIGRANTS

17

TABLE 13 A GE DISTRIBUTION OF EXTERNAL MIGRANT W ORKERS

18

TABLE 14 EDUCATION LEVELS OF EXTERNAL MIGRANT W ORKERS

19

TABLE 15 YEARS W O RKED A BROAD BY EXTERNAL MIGRANT W ORKERS

19

TABLE 16 ANNUAL C ASH REMITTANCES BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND SECTO R 20
TABLE 17 MONEY SENT HOME: AVERAGE AMOUNT OVER A YEAR
BY MIGRANT T YPE

21

TABLE 18 FREQUENCY OF HOME VISITS

22

TABLE 19 MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES

24

ANNEX 1 W EALTH POINT DETERMINANTS

FOR

ANE SURVEY

28

MIGRATION P OLICY SERIES N O . 43

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
espite Mozambique’s economic growth rate being one of the
highest in Africa over the past few years, much of the growth
is linked to the development of highly capital intensive
“mega” projects with limited absorption of unskilled workers.
The urban informal sector which has hitherto absorbed considerable
numbers of the unemployed has become less attractive for the rural
labour surpluses as increasing competition makes economic survival
more difficult. Such limitations within the domestic economy, recently
exacerbated by the current drought in the South, has forced many rural
households to seek employment in South Africa. Although external
migration to South Africa is the preferred employment option for many
Mozambicans, it represents the option of last resort for many others simply because of the limited employment absorption capacity
Mozambique’s formal economy.
The South African mines are the traditional destination of male
Mozambican labour migrants. The number of migrants has remained
relatively consistent over the last decade despite major downsizing in
the industry as a whole. Mozambicans now make up 25% of the goldmine workforce (up from 10% in 1990). Mozambican miners may collectively be seen as a wage elite. Households with several generations of
miners are likely to have built up assets and a home-based production
capacity that would put them well above the economic status of other
households with a more recent involvement in mine-migration.
Households with miners with greater skills, longer service or with more
than one miner, may have relatively high earnings. However, a significant proportion of sending households could be considered to be poor.
Differentiation between households is even more pronounced when
looked at across the entire range of migrant-sending households.
Rural Southern Mozambique, an area relatively bereft of resources
and traditionally less productive agriculturally than other regions of
Mozambique (due to poorer soils and erratic weather patterns) is now
more developed and better off (at least in terms of average income and
levels of wealth) than other rural areas. The pool of economic assets of
the average rural household in the South is far greater than for other
regions. This difference is largely attributable to labour migration and
the transfer of significant volumes of remittances. There is, however,
much evidence to suggest that many migrant households remain poor,
having low levels of agricultural production and being highly dependent
on relatively low levels of wage transfers.
Especially since the abolition of apartheid, employment opportunities for Mozambicans in South Africa have become much more varied,
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leading to a much higher degree of household differentiation than prevailed before 1990. In South Africa, employment is available for almost
anyone willing to risk the consequences of unauthorized entry and prepared to be exploited, meaning that the remittances or accumulated
wages brought home are likely to be minimal. Although migrant worker
households are often better off than non-migrant supplying households,
significant numbers of such households are still vulnerable to poverty.
These households are usually deficit agricultural producers, being largely
dependent on migrant remittances. In turn, with the increasingly harsh
position on unskilled undocumented migrants in South Africa, their
employment situation has become less and less secure.
This paper under takes an inter-regional analysis of the South,
Centre and North of Mozambique, demonstrating clear developmental
differences attributed to many years of r emittances channeled to the
mainly rural areas of Southern Mozambique. This is followed by an
analysis of the results of SAMP’s Migration and Remittance Survey
(MARS) conducted in Southern Mozambique in 2004 which provides
useful insights into the disparity of wealth and well-being among external migrant-sending households.
Although the overall economic impact of migrant labour has been
positive in the South of Mozambique, because the nature of migration
has changed so significantly over the last 15 years (i.e. the eclipsing of
mine migration and increasing numbers of young Mozambican men
chasing a limited number of jobs), it is likely that, in the coming years,
the economic impact of migrant labour work in South Africa may
diminish quite substantially as the amounts of wages remitted are
reduced (due to lower earnings) and the mechanisms available for doing
so are much more limited than for miners and workers in other, more
privileged, wage sectors.

2
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INTRODUCTION
outhern Mozambique has been a significant labour exporting
area for more than 150 years. 1 Apart from migration occurring
from Tete Pr ovince to Southern Rhodesia in the early 1900s,
the rest of Mozambique supplied almost no external labour
migration and experienced comparatively little internal labour migration. Such a regional dichotomy allows for interesting comparisons,
especially in relation to the impact of migration on household accumulation and wealth. In the 1980s, household differentiation was clearly
evident in Southern Mozambique due largely to the fairly significant
wage differentials between r elatively skilled and unskilled mineworkers.2
They argued that, although many migrant-sending households clearly
benefited from migration, the majority of migrant-sending households
remained impoverished and became wage-dependent as their capacity
to produce subsistence crops diminished. External work opportunities
and conditions for migrants, especially since the abolition of apartheid,
have become much mor e varied, leading to a much higher degree of
household differentiation than prevailed from the mid-1800s to 1990.3
This paper attempts to demonstrate that rural Southern
Mozambique, an area relatively bereft of resources and traditionally less
productive agriculturally than other regions of Mozambique (due to
poorer soils and erratic weather patterns) is now more developed and
better off (at least in terms of average income and levels of wealth) than
other rural areas. This difference is largely attributed to labour migration and the transfer of significant volumes of remittances.
Although migrant worker households are often seen as better off
than non-migrant supplying households, there are, indeed, significant
numbers of such households that are vulnerable to poverty. These
households are usually deficit agricultural producers, being largely
dependent on migrant remittances. In turn, with the increasingly harsh
position on unskilled illegal migrants in South Africa, their employment situation has become less and less secure. 4 Although external
migration is the preferred employment option for many Mozambicans, it
represents the option of last resort for many others simply because of the
limited employment absorption capacity Mozambique’s formal economy.
In South Africa, employment is available for almost anyone willing to
risk the consequences of illegal entry and prepared to be exploited,
meaning that the remittances or accumulated wages brought home are
likely to be minimal.
This paper under takes an inter-regional analysis (based on the r esults
of a national survey of some 4,000 rural households) of the South,
Centre and North of Mozambique, demonstrating what are argued to be
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clear developmental differences attributed to many years of remittances
channeled to the mainly rural areas of southern Mozambique. This is
then complemented by an analysis of the results of SAMP’s Migration
and Remittance Survey (MARS) conducted in Southern Mozambique
in 2004 which provides useful insights into the disparity of wealth and
well-being among external migrant-sending households.

METHODOLOGY
his study draws mainly from the results of two surveys: the
ANE/Austral Survey of Rural Households (1999-2001) and
the SAMP Migration and Remittance Survey (MARS)
(2004) described below. Supporting data was drawn from the
SAMP Survey of Mozambican Miners (1996). The rural household
study is used because it incorporated detailed questions on migrant
labour and looked at a broad range of variables to determine household
wealth which were felt to be more adequate in measuring the developmental impact of remittances. The results of the recent Migrant and
Remittance Survey (MARS) provide important new revelations on
migrant remittance patterns which help us better understand the influence of migration on development and household differentiation.
Details of the three surveys are provided below.

T

ANE/AUSTRAL SURVEY OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS (1999-2001)
The National Roads Administration (ANE) in collaboration with the
consulting company Austral Consultants conducted a comprehensive
rural household survey covering all regions of Mozambique along selected sections of rehabilitated secondary roads. The sample consisted of
approximately 4,000 households. These households were visited annually during a period of 3 years (1999-2001) with the objective of measuring the socio-economic impact of road rehabilitation. The survey provided an excellent opportunity to collect detailed economic data for
rural households including comprehensive information on migrant
labour.5 Because of the amount of information the survey was able to
collect, an analysis of household wealth was possible by converting
assets, income, housing conditions and investment patterns into wealth
points, allowing for regional comparisons.6 Regions were defined as follows:
• South: Provinces of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane as well as
Maputo City;
• Centre: Sofala, Manica, Zambezia and Tete;
• North: Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado.
4
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SAMP MIGRATION AND REMITTANCE SURVEY (2004)
The SADC Migration and Remittance Survey (MARS) was conducted
in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.
The survey interviewed only households with external migrants and
focused on remittance patterns and migration history. The Mozambique
survey was conducted in early 2004, consisting of 726 households located only in the South. The survey areas were randomly sampled and
included households in rural areas and in urban areas.7

SAMP SURVEY

OF M OZAMBICAN

MINERS (1996)

An earlier survey of mineworkers was undertaken by SAMP in
Mozambique.8 The study interviewed 455 miners during the months of
August and September 1996 (493 miners in Lesotho). Interviews were
conducted at the Teba/Wenela depots at Ressano Garcia and
Johannesburg as well as the depots of the recruiting agency Algos which
recruits mine and farm labour. In addition a separate survey instrument
was used for interviewing 160 miners’ wives in the provinces of
Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo provinces.

WAGE EMPLOYMENT
MOZAMBIQUE

AND

MIGRATION PATTERNS IN RURAL

age employment for the purposes of this paper refers to
full-time employment of household members. “Full-time
employment” is essentially seen as the full-time pursuit of
an income-generating activity that is not linked to the
household economy. Significantly, this includes the growing number of
members who are engaged in informal trading activities away from
home. Employees are split into two main categories: commuter workers
who normally sleep at their household and absentee workers who are
based sufficiently far away from their household to allow for only periodic visits. Absentee workers are essentially migrant workers and these
are split into two sub-groups: internal and external i.e. working within
Mozambique or in a foreign country.
The ANE study found that one-quarter of all households have at
least one member engaged in wage employment but the distribution of
wage-worker supplying households is highly skewed. More than half
(55%) of the rural households of the South have members engaged in
wage employment compared with only 18% in the Centre and 7% in
the North. Second, the wage employment opportunities available for
the South are overwhelmingly located at a considerable distance from
the households. In the North and South more than half the wage work-

W
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ers are employed in the same district as their households (73% and 58%
respectively). Of the households with wage employees, 75% of the
households of the South have absentee workers (32% for the Centre
and 41% for the North). Reflecting the relative imbalance of male
adults, the percentage of female-headed households with wage workers
is only 42% versus 60% for male-headed households.
Of households with a wage worker, most of those in the South have
more than one worker in wage employment (averaging 1.6) while
almost all in the Centre and North have around one (1.1 and 1.3
respectively). Households in the South are therefore not only mor e
dependent in terms of the proportion of households involved with
migrant labour but there is also a higher degree of labour participation
in wage employment by households with wage workers. Of all the wage
employees, 42.5% could be considered commuter workers i.e.workers
who normally sleep at the household.
Almost one-tenth (9.6%) of all households were found to have seasonal workers (usually employed according to agricultural needs) who
worked an average of 5 months a year. Seasonal work opportunities
were concentrated in the South and Centre (with 14.3% and 11.6% of
households providing seasonal workers respectively compared with barely more than 1% in the North).
Reflecting the higher wages in South Africa (and to a certain extent
wages in Maputo), the ANE sur vey found in 2001 that more than twothir ds (67.6%) of the households in the South have workers earning the
equivalent of more than USD 60 per month compared to only 13.7% in
the Centre, while more than half of the households of the Centre
claimed that wage earnings were less than US$12 or considerably less
than the minimum wage. 9
Historical and other factors have ensured that large numbers of
workers from the rural South are employed outside Mozambique. The
ANE study found that more than half (53%) of the wage employees
coming from households of the South were working outside the country.
In very sharp contrast, both the Centre and North had almost no workers migrating abroad, having, respectively, only 3% and less than 1% of
their workers outside Mozambique. Despite the strong dependency on
South Africa employment, economic development within Southern
Mozambique has managed to absorb almost half (47%) of the workers
coming from the rural areas of the South. Most of these workers are
located outside of their districts in contrast to the large majority of
workers being located near their household in the Centre and North.
The adult population for the purposes of the MARS study was
defined as 20 years or older i.e. 49.1% of the household population. Of
the adult population, 66% were earning an “income” of some sort and
6
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more than half (55%) of the adults earning an income were external
migrants.10 The survey found that that virtually all (94.1%) of the external migrants were located in South Africa and that the vast majority
(93.1%) were male. Almost half (47.3%) the external migrants were
found to be in the age cohort of 25-39. More than half (54.9%) of the
external migrants were married, with 15% cohabitating and 26%
unmarried.
Significantly, more than half (50.7%) of the migrants were sons (and
in a few cases daughters) of household heads while just over a third
(34.9%) of the migrants are household heads (coming from just over
half of the households). More than a third (36.2%) of the total household adult population were external migrants. In 2001 the ANE survey
found an average of 1.52 absentee (migrant) workers per household. In
2004, the MARS Mozambique survey found an average 1.51 external
migrants per household. Applying the survey results with a few assumptions, it would appear that almost all adult sons can be considered
external migrants.11 External migrants are generally poorly educated:
only 15.2% of the external migrants have secondary education and most
(70.5%) have primary education, while 8.2% have no education at all.
Almost half (46.1%) the household population are either students
(22.8%) or consider ed to be too young to work (23.3%). Of the remaining 53.9% of the population, the biggest occupational category was
farmer (27.7%), 13.9% were unemployed job seekers, 9.3% mineworkers, 4.4% trader/hawkers and 4.2%unskilled manual worker. In terms of
the sectors employing migrants, minework as a single work/sectoral category still dominates (at 31.3%). The informal sector (at 11.4%) is the
second most important, followed by manufacturing industry (6.4%),
domestic service (3.8%) and agricylture (2.1%). A further 3.1% wer e
self-employed business persons and 3.0% skilled manual workers. The
remaining 30% occupy a variety of different jobs while about 7% of the
total were unknown. The agricultural sector is surprisingly underrepresented since many illegal migrants entering into South Africa are likely
to be caught up in agricultural work in Mpumalanga Province before
advancing on to other work (if at all). It may well be that agricultural
work is much more dominant but that household members simply do
not know where their migrant members are working.12
Internal migration for domestic employment from rural households
in the South of Mozambique has been found to be almost as high as the
rate of external migration. However, the number of household members
from external migrant-sending households found working as migrants
within Mozambique is very low. The MARS data shows that 19.1% of
the total household population live outside of Mozambique and that
only 3.7% of the household population lives away from the household
7
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in another part of Mozambique. This suggests that migrant sending
households tend to either send migrants abroad or within Mozambqiue,
but rarely in combination.

MIGRATION AND H OUSEHOLD W EALTH PATTERNS
vidence collected from the ANE survey over 3 years of consecutive interviews from approximately 4,000 households, shows
stark disparity between the three regions in terms of household
income and assets (wealth). The South, poor in natural
resources and more prone to drought and floods than the other regions,
has labour migration (both external and internal) as the most important
economic feature distinguishing it from the Centre and North. It is
ther efore hypothesized, that in the absence of any other explanatory
variable, that the significant regional differences are, in lar ge part,
attributable to the long term effects of migration. Although on average
households from the South are better off in material terms compared to
the rest of the country, there are many households in the South which,
even with external migration, may be poorer and more vulnerable than
other households in the region as both the level of remittances are low
and subsistence production marginal and susceptible to unpredictable
climate. Furthermore, in terms of development, household wealth may
not be a good proxy as households of the South are highly dependent
on employment opportunities in both South Africa and, to a lesser
extent, the Maputo-Matola axis.
The data collected from both the ANE and the MARS surveys
found significant demographic patterns that separated the South from
the other regions but also distinguished external migrant-supplying
households from other households in the South. The ANE survey found
that the average household size for the South (6.38) was larger than the
Centre (6.05) and in the North (5.38). Data for household size was
consistent for ever y year of the three year study.13
The MARS data on external migrant sending households clearly
demonstrates the impact of external migration on household size. The
average household size was 8.48, considerably higher than the average
for the South found in the ANE study. This is attributable to the fact
that almost 60% of the households are considered to be extended (usually having the wife of the migrant son and their children). Some
11.2% of the external migrant-sending household population is comprised of grandchildren and 4.3% of sons or daughters-in-law (the vast
majority in fact being the wives of sons who have migrated). Migration
does not necessarily come from large families, but in fact, creates large
families by amalgamating families affected by migration (see below).

E
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In a country like Mozambique where migrant labour is dominant in
some regions, the distinction between de jure and de facto heads is critical. In provinces such as Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane, absentee
migrant husbands r emain the key household decision maker, albeit not
on a day to day basis. Many de jure female-headed households in the
South would have been listed as household heads in most Government
surveys. But in most households with absentee husbands, he was considered the household head. Only a few married females with absentee
husbands were considered to be household head. The MARS survey
found that only 12.3% of external migrant sending households are considered to be “female centred” (effectively de jure female headed).
About a quarter (23.7%) of the households were considered to be
“nuclear” and a large 59.5% were felt to be “extended”. The reason for
such a small percentage of de jure female-headed households is that
these households have less adult labour available for migration (see discussion below).
The ANE survey found that the principal migrant sending zone (the
South) has a considerably higher proportion (about one quarter) of de
jure female-headed households than other regions (14.3% in the Centre
and 10.9% in the North). In the South, de jure female headed households are dominated by widowed women (almost two-thirds). This par tially reflects the exposure of migrant workers to dangerous work such as
on the South African gold mines (in recent years, AIDS has emerged as
the major risk to migrant workers with an estimated 50% of
Mozambican mineworkers HIV positive).
One of the best indicators of household wealth (and some would
argue welfare) in Mozambique is the material used for building residences. The building of cement houses is usually a priority for miners.
The 1996 SAMP sur vey found that 42% of the respondents had constructed cement block housing. The ANE/Austral survey found that one
of the biggest contrasts between the regions was in relation to housing:
in the South almost a quarter (23.8%) of the households have constructed their principal houses with cement blocks. In the Centre this
dropped to 5.4% and in the North to less than 1%. The type of roofing
showed even greater variation: in the South almost two-thirds (64.6%)
of the houses had non-thatch roofing (mainly zinc sheets). In the
Centre 86.9% of the houses had thatch roofs and in the North almost
all (98.8%).
Notable r egional differences were also noted in the source of lighting
and the use of river/spring water as the principal source of water.
Migration is also likely to have had a big impact on farming practices. The ANE report found some very significant regional differences.
Perhaps reflecting the difference in family size as well as the poorer soil
9
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Table 1: Indicators of Living Conditions
Variable

South (%)

Centre (%)

North (%)

Cement walls

23.8

5.4

0.6

Thatch roof

34.1

86.9

98.1

Cement floor

52.0

10.1

1.9

Source of lighting – kerosene

85.9

52.8

39.6

Cooking fuel- firewood

94.9

90.5

94.0

River/spring as principal source of water

17.9

49.9

61.1

Source: ANE

fertility, the households of the South averaged more fields (2.8) and a
significantly larger area (3.4 Ha) cultivated. In the Centre, households
cultivated an average of 2.2 fields and 2.6 Ha; in the North, 1.8 and 2.2
Ha.
Just more than half (50.6%) of the households of the South cultivate
an area in excess of 2 Ha versus 31.9% in the Centre and 24.9% in the
North (Table 2).
Table 2: Distribution of Cultivated Fields by Size
Size

South

Centre

North

<1 ha

4.3

8.9

7.0

1<2 ha

45.0

59.2

68.1

2< 5 ha

37.2

26.5

21.4

5<10 ha

11.0

4.4

2.7

> 10 ha

2.4

1.0

0.8

Source: ANE

There was also a notable difference in the use of farming technology.
A much larger percentage of farmers in the South used improved seeds
and chemical fertilizer (Table 3). The higher use of pesticides in the
Centre and in the North is due to the higher numbers of cotton growers
who are usually supplied with pesticides by the outgrower company
(Table 3).
Table 3 Farming Practices
South (%)

Centre (%)

North (%)

Improved Seeds

25.6

15.2

3.3

Chemical Fertilizer

6.1

1.5

1.5

Pesticides

3.2

4.9

11.2

Source: ANE

10
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Although households in the South appear to be growing staple crops
in at least the same proportions as other regions, the percentage of
households in the South selling crops is significantly less than in other
regions (Table 4). The 1996 miners’ study found that the majority of
miners’ households were entirely dependent on mine earnings as a
source of cash income. The contribution of agricultural sales in the vast
majority of cases was negligible. While the national average is 29%,
only a small minority of miner’s households (11.4%) sell their crops.
The large percentage of households in the North engaged in selling
crops is because this is virtually the only way households can earn cash.
Although the amounts are small, this cash is used for buying basic consumer goods and paying for services such as health and education.
Table 4: Households Growing and Selling Selected Crops
Crops

South

Centre

North

%
households
growing

% selling
(of those
growing)

%
households
growing

% selling
(of those
growing)

%
households
growing

% selling
(of those
growing)

Maize

90

17

83

22

89

70

Manioc

86

19

48

10

72

41

Groundnuts

69

13

26

12

38

51

Sweet Potatoes

45

7

45

11

25

57

Sorghum

2

17

45

5

46

46

Vegetables

60

8

20

32

17

41

Rice

4

32

31

13

28

38

Sesame

23

16

8

12

7

96

Millet

2

0

22

2

3

40

Cotton

2

68

7

82

13

98

Sunflower

1

25

3

26

2

73

Other crops

19

14

14

13

46

30

Cashew

32

16

3

37

16

78

Coconuts

30

18

1

46

6

95

Other fruit

17

27

10

40

17

95

Source: ANE

Traditionally, the main form of savings for migrants with surplus
earnings is livestock, particularly cattle. The civil war which ended in
1992 had decimated the national herd. This is slowly recovering and
there are indications that households still attach a great deal of importance to livestock accumulation. Table 5 shows that households of the
11
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South hold significantly more livestock than the other regions, with the
greatest disparities arising in relation to cattle ownership.
Table 5: Ownership Livestock
Type of
livestock

South

Centre

North

%

Average
number

%

Average
number

%

Average
number

Cattle

18.5

6.4

4.8

7.7

0.1

2.0

Goats

52.7

5.2

38.8

9.3

21.7

6.1

Pigs

42.3

2.9

22.8

4.9

6.3

3.3

Chickens

72.6

11.4

68.1

10.2

8.3

Source: ANE

In the South the two dominant non-agricultural activities are (a)
the production of traditional drinks and (b) commerce, followed by the
production/sale of charcoal and firewood, and “specialized” work. In the
Centre, commerce is the dominant activity, followed by traditional
drinks and then a group of activities that are more or less equal in ranking, including char coal and firewood, handicraft fishing/selling fish and
specialized work. In the North three activities are closely bunched at
the top; handicrafts, commerce and charcoal/firewood. In the South
between 20-60% of all the homesteads involved in these activities
earned at least the equivalent of US $40 per month. By contrast, only
about a fifth of the households of the Centre and North involved in
commerce managed to earn at this level. Very few households involved
in the other activities managed to earn at this level.
Much higher percentages of the households in the South hold commonly owned assets with the exception of bicycles (Table 6).
Households in the South are also much more inclined to make
investments than those in the other regions (Table 7). More than half
the male-headed households in the South invested more than about the
equivalent of US $40 in the previous year compared with considerably
lower percentages in the Centre (39.1%) and North (17.7%). Femaleheaded households tended to invest less but in similar regional relative
proportions as male-headed households. Most of the investment went
into construction or rehabilitation of residences. Relatively little went
into agricultural activities or transport.
Not only is the proportion of houses undertaking investments gr eater
than 500,000 MT significantly greater, the value of the investments
were also higher. More than a quarter of the households in the South
invested values in excess of 5 million MT (about USD 400) in residences, agricultural equipment, transport, and animals. In contrast,
12
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Table 6: Selected Inanimate Asset Holdings
Type

South

Centre

North

Solar panel

17.6

0.6

0.2

Bicycle

35.1

51.7

40.1

Pick-up van

20.0

0.8

0

Car

7.8

0.6

0.1

Tractor

1.9

0.3

0

Refrigerator

14.2

1.5

0

Television

11.7

1.9

0

Video

10.6

0.6

0

Music system

35.9

14.3

3.6

Generator

3.9

0.1

0

Grain mill

12.6

0.6

0.1

Plough

17.6

2.5

0.1

Watch

66.7

34.0

10.1

Water tank

12.8

1.6

0.1

Large water drum

59.1

9.2

2.1

Source: ANE

Table 7: Investments (above 500,000 MT) made in last year % of households
South

Centre

North

Male-headed

54.1

39.1

17.7

Female-headed

35.4

24.8

10.0

Residence

35.8

16.0

6.7

Transport

6.9

12.0

5.6

Agricultural equipment

4.8

2.7

3.6

Animals

8.6

2.4

1.1

Source: ANE

virtually none of the investing households of the Centre and North had
reached such levels.
The ANE survey also showed that rural households in the South had
much better access to social services such as education, health services
and roads. Due to the difficulties of measurement and recall, the
ANE/Austral survey failed to obtain accurate infor mation on household
self-consumption of agricultural produce and livestock.
Notwithstanding, an attempt was made to consolidate numerous variables (including wage income, investments, housing materials, assets,
farming techniques, size of farm, and so on) and to convert them (somewhat subjectively) into “wealth points” (see Appendix for details on
13
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what variables were selected and their point distribution). As expected,
the distribution of wealth points was highly skewed towards poverty
with the vast majority of households considered poor. More than threequarters (77.3%) had less than 50 points and half had less than 25
points (the average being 36.8). Only 5.5% had more than 100.
Levels of wealth vary considerably between the regions. More than
half the households in the South were found to be in the highest quartile (Table 8). By contrast, almost half the households of the North
were found in the lowest quartile and barely 5% in the highest
quartile14 .
Table 8: Distribution of Wealth Points by Region (%)
Quartiles

Region

Total

South

Centre

North

1st quartile (lowest)

11.6

24.4

48.0

26.7

2nd quartile

12.8

27.9

28.9

24.1

3rd quartile

23.7

28.6

17.4

24.6

4th quartile (highest)

51.9

19.1

5.7

24.6

Total

100

100

100

100

Source: ANE

There is a greater concentration of female-headed households in the
lowest quartile. More than a third (35.7%) of female-headed households
fall into the lowest quartile compared to just under a quarter of the
male-headed households. Somewhat surprisingly, however, amongst the
wealthiest households, there appears to be an almost equal chance
among female or male-headed households to be in the highest quartile
(25.3% for male-headed and 21.6% for female-headed.

REMITTANCES

AND

POVERTY IN THE SOUTH

n the previous section, inter-regional household welfare comparisons provide convincing evidence that the accumulated effect of
both internal and external migration has resulted in a significant
disparity of wealth between the households of the South and those
of the Centre and North. This section seeks to demonstrate that,
although the overall impact of labour migration has been positive in the
southern region as a whole, involvement in migrant wage labour itself
does not necessarily guarantee that the household will be better off than
households that have not sent members abroad to work.
The most obvious cause of economic differentiation between external migrant-sending households would be the level of remuneration

I
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which, in turn, depends on the income-generating capacity of the
migrant for which level of education and years of experience would be
good indicators. The level of remuneration would also be affected by
the sector of employment, privilege of certain households in gaining
access to the mining sector and the legal status of the migrant.
Differentiation is also strongly influenced by the degree of commitment
of migrant workers to remit money or goods to their households. This,
in turn, is influenced by the facilities available to different types of
migrants to remit money or remittances. This differs by type of migrant,
location and sector.
Another important factor is the size of the family, which usually
determines the labour resources available for migration. In most rural
areas a minimum number of members will be needed at home to ensure
that basic household needs are undertaken. As the opportunity cost of
migration decreases, the incentive to migrate increases for “redundant”
household members. Larger households would therefore have a larger
propensity to “export” household labour. Closely related to this issue is
gender as de jure female-headed households would have a much lower
propensity to export labour than male-headed ones.
Finally, a very important determinant of household differentiation is
the history of migration of the households. Through primogenitor
inheritance and the tendency of many households of the South to continue sending sons to work on the South African mines, those with a
multi-generational migrant history are likely to have accumulated more
assets (i.e. cattle, land, housing, household goods, vehicles).than those
with a shorter history.
This section draws mainly on the findings of the Mozambique component of the MARS survey of external migrant-sending households.
Remitted cash is the most fr equently cited source of household income
(75.5%) followed by remitted goods (64.2%) (Table 9). Income from
wage work was cited by a third of the households (33.5%). If “wage
income” refers largely to deferred pay, combined with the values attributed to migrant related contributions, migrant contributions provide the
overwhelming share of household income (Table 10). Migrant remittances (cash and goo ds) are therefore used as a proxy for total household income.
Some 78% of the households interviewed have migrants sending
money home. Significantly, almost a quarter (22%) of the migrant-sending households do not receive cash income from migrant workers. This
percentage may be partly inflated by the fact that some households may
not yet have received a cash transfer (as new entrants into the migrant
labour system) or the respondent was not aware of cash transfers. It is
also likely that many migrants are working under such exploitative
15
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Table 9: Household income from all sources (by frequency)
Responses

% of households % of responses

Wage work

243

33.5

13.6

Casual work

103

14.2

5.8

Remittances – money

548

75.5

30.6

Remittances – goods

466

64.2

26

Income from farm products

161

22.2

9

Income from formal business

30

4.1

1.7

Income from informal business

157

21.6

8.8

Pension/disability

23

3.2

1.3

Gifts

22

3.0

1.2

Other

23

3.2

1.3

Refused to answer

11

1.5

0.6

Don’t know

4

0.5

0.2

Total

1791

100

Source: MARS

Table 10 Household Income by Source and Value
Valid N

Mean

Median

Wage work

N=149

$1,016.19

$608.70

Casual work

N=44

$226.67

$65.22

Remittances – money

N=438

$523.99

$347.83

Remittances – goods

N=266

$393.79

$217.39

Income from farm products

N=115

$103.84

$39.13

Income from formal business

N=8

$779.89

$391.30

Income from informal business

N=84

$255.72

$130.43

Pension/disability

N=15

$263.45

$86.96

Gifts

N=12

$60.94

$26.09

Other income

N=11

$226.48

$52.17

Total income

N=579

$936.91

$528.26

Source: MARS

conditions that they do not have sufficient surpluses to remit.
Table 10 shows that that the average value of remittances received is
closely correlated with the frequency that the money is sent.
Households receiving remittances on a monthly basis averaged about
US$ 825 vs US$ 123 for those receiving once a year. Most migrants
send money home either once a month or every quarter (Table 11).
Mozambican migrants in South Africa have large discrepancies in
16
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Table 11: Frequency and Value of Money Remittances
Valid N

Mean

Median

Twice or more per month

N=13

$630.77

$365.22

Once a month

N=135

$862.39

$782.61

More than twice in 3 months

N=37

$327.09

$304.35

Once in 3 months

N=147

$0.02

$326.09

Once every 6 months

N=68

$201.62

$163.04

Once a year

N=82

$123.40

$65.22

At end of the contract

N=4

$240.22

$197.83

Other

N=67

$494.16

$304.35

Don’t know

N=15

$435.65

$478.26

Source: MARS

their earnings due to three basic factors: i) the sector in which they are
engaged which, in the case of the relatively well-paid mining sector, can
be said to be the exclusive privilege of those households with members
currently engaged in that sector ii) the education and experience of the
migrants and iii) the legal status of the migrant.
The MARS survey showed that Mozambican migrants are employed
in a variety of sectors (Table 12). Of the 1,081 migrants, 31.3% were
involved in mining, 11.4% in informal activities and 1.4% in agriculture and 16.7% were listed as “other”15 . Significantly, the activities of
18% of the migrants were unknown. This is not surprising as many
migrants do not know what type of work they will be doing before they
Table 12: Sectoral Distribution of External Migrants
Main work place

Number

%

Factory

67

6.4

Mine

329

31.3

Shop

31

2.9

Office

14

1.3

Government

5

0.5

Informal

120

11.4

Domestic

13

1.2

Farm

15

1.4

Profession

31

2.9

School

5

0.5

Other

230

21.9

Don’t know

191

18.2

Source: MARS
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leave. Many of these are likely to end up on the farms of adjacent
Mpumalanga Province.
Although information was not gathered in r elation to the actual levels of earnings, a few important observations can be made. First, about
one-third of the migrants work in the mining sector and would be earning substantially more than those engaged in other sectors. The relatively higher level of earnings for miners is complemented by facilities
that make the transfer of wages and goods relatively easier than for
other migrants, thus making households with mine migrants generally
considerably better off than other households. At the other end of the
scale, it is likely that many migrants, for whom no information is available, are likely to be those who have relatively little contact with their
households and had no fixed plans for work before migrating. Many of
these migrants are likely to be illegal and working under exploitative
low-paid work.
What has happened over approximately a 20 year period (19751994), is that households with mine migrants became a type of elite
among external migrant sending households. With the abolition of
apartheid, new opportunities arose for foreign migrants to penetrate
areas of the economy hitherto inaccessible. This allowed for
Mozambicans with good education and relevant work experience to
work in South Africa for considerably higher salaries than in
Mozambique. The South African economy effectively became an extension to Southern Mozambique, offering a broad range of employment
and income generating opportunities.
Table 13: Age Distribution of External Migrant Workers
Age

Number

%

14 and less

0

0

15 to 24

127

11.7

25 to 39

514

47.3

40 to 59

182

16.7

60 and over

12

1.1

Don’t know

252

23.2

Source: MARS

Table 13 shows almost a normal distribution of age of the migrants,
suggesting that intake and attrition are fairly balanced. Younger
migrants are likely to be earning less than older ones, but younger
migrants employed on the mines are likely to be earning more than
many of the older migrants working in other sectors.
Apart from sector and legitimacy, earnings capacity is largely
18
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Table 14 Education Levels of External Migrant Workers
Education

Number

%

None

89

8.2

Primary

770

70.5

Secondary

166

15.2

Diploma

0

0

Degree

0

0

Don’t know

67

6.1

Source: MARS

determined by the level of education and work experience. Table 14
shows that the vast majority (at least 70.5%) of the migrants have only
primary education and 8.2% have none at all. With the exception of
those employed on the mines, and those with many years of work experience, the poorly educated migrants are likely to be earning relatively
low wages. Only 15.2% of the external migrants have achieved secondary education and are likely to be earning comparatively higher wages.
The majority of migrants (62.4%) had been working in South Africa for
less than ten years (Table 15). However, nearly 20% were long-term
migrants of 15 years or more.
Table 15: Years Worked Abroad by External Migrant Workers
Years

#

%

1-5

284

31.8

6-10

273

30.6

11-15

167

18.7

16 or more

156

17.5

Don’t know

13

1.5

Total

893

100

Source: MARS

The survey showed distinct differences in the average annual
amounts of cash remitted by level of education (Table 16). There is a
big difference in the amounts remitted by those with only primary education and secondary, the former sending an average of US$ 784 and
the latter sending US$ 1,072. There was considerable sectoral variation,
the most notable being the higher amounts linked to the mines and to
what were referred to as “professionals” (Table 16). Remittances coming
from the “don’t know” category were low (closely in line with informal
and domestic employment) and may reflect the fact that these migrants
are involved in first time or illegal jobs.
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Table 16: Annual Cash Remittances by Level of Education and Sector
Valid N

Mean

Median

None

N=40

$444.60

$304.35

Primary

N=424

$426.32

$269.13

Secondary

N=82

$582.36

$347.83

Don’t know

N=28

$492.45

$428.26

$0.00

$0.00

a. Education

b. Main Work Place
Factory

N=37

$390.09

$304.35

Mine

N=249

$537.22

$434.78

Shop

N=20

$462.15

$201.09

Office

N=5

$427.22

$243.48

Government

N=1

$434.78

$434.78

Informal

N=48

$312.57

$158.70

Domestic

N=6

$323.19

$304.35

Farm

N=5

$241.30

$239.13

Professional categories

N=16

$842.93

$304.35

School

N=2

$67.39

$67.39

Other

N=124

$402.84

$173.91

Don’t know

N=43

$338.52

$152.17

The MARS survey found that overwhelmingly the most common
form of remitting either money or goods is taking them back personally
or through friends, despite significant changes in transfer technology.
The most important changes relate to improved banking facilities for
miners using TEBA Bank and the pr e-paid delivery services of Kawena
Distributors. Kawena, formerly limited to serving mineworkers, now
offers facilities in various cities and towns in South Africa and to anyone wishing to deliver goods to any accessible household in Southern
Mozambique or to one of a large network of warehouses.
With time, more sophisticated transfer mechanisms will be increasingly used by Mozambicans working in South Africa. Illiterate or poorly-educated as well as undocumented migrants will probably not have
access to or be suspicious of using these methods, thereby exacerbating
economic differentiation between the relatively wealthy and the poorer
households.
Of major importance to the determination of remittance flows, is the
degree of commitment by the migrant in remitting wages or goods.
Commitment is felt to be closely linked to gender, marital status, age
and relationship to the household head.
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Annually, household heads send considerably more (US$ 1,000)
than their sons/daughters (US$ 625) or spouses (US$ 560) and males
send more than females (US$ 840 vs. US$ 688). As expected, the older
the migrant, the higher the remittances. Cash remittances also
increased by age, increasing steadily up to the 40-59 cohort (average
14m MT/USD1,112) but decreases thereafter. Married migrants predictably send home much mor e money than non-married (almost twice
as much).
Table 17: Money sent home: average amount over a year by Migrant Type
Relationship

Valid N

Mean

Median

Head

N=285

$570.31

$417.39

Spouse/partner

N=26

$316.91

$219.57

Son/ daughter

N=224

$341.41

$173.91

Father/ mother

N=3

$628.99

$608.70

Brother/ sister

N=27

$317.01

$173.91

Grandchild

N=3

$333.33

$434.78

Son/ daughter-in-law

N=2

$165.22

$165.22

Nephew/ niece

N=5

$456.96

$217.39

Other relative

N=1

$380.43

$380.43

Male

N=553

$457.65

$304.35

Female

N=23

$374.64

$152.17

15 to 24

N=55

$247.57

$152.17

25 to 39

N=292

$457.21

$304.35

40 to 59

N=119

$612.53

$434.78

60 and over

N=9

$472.71

$304.35

Don’t know

N=99

$372.19

$217.39

Unmarried

N=79

$264.92

$160.87

Married

N=367

$498.29

$347.83

Cohabiting

N=109

$474.51

$330.43

Divorced

N=7

$298.14

$260.87

Separated

N=3

$236.23

$304.35

Widowed

N=4

$196.20

$109.78

Don’t know

N=1

$260.87

$260.87

Gender

Age

Marital status

Source: MARS
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The MARS survey found that 42.7% of the households cannot
depend on their migrant members in times of need. This is partly due to
the fact that one in five migrants cannot be contacted during an emergency. The average amount of cash sent for emergencies was approximately US$ 100 while for goods sent it was about US$ 50. Almost twothirds of those who had received assistance felt that the money/goods
sent was very important.
Commitment is further manifested by the frequency of visits home.
The ANE data shows that in the South, only one-tenth (10.4%) of
migrants visit their homes regularly (monthly) while 80.3% of the
absentee workers return periodically (but predictably) between 1 month
to once a year, with 9.5% seldom returning, if at all. The MARS data
(table 6.1.10) found similar patterns: a majority of the migrants (62.4%)
return home at the most twice a year (42.5% visit only once a year)
(Table 18). Only 10.7% visit more frequently, while the movements of
just over a quarter of the migrants is categorized as “other” of whom
many would include migrants with unpredictable visiting patterns,
including many migrants who are either undocumented or whose activities/plans are not known.
Table 18: Frequency of Home Visits
Frequency

#

%

Twice or more per month

21

2.1

Once a month

23

2.3

More than twice in 3 months

13

1.3

Once in three months

54

5.3

Once every 6 months

177

17.4

Once a year

433

42.5

At end of the contract

25

2.5

Other

274

26.9

Source: SAMP

The evidence fr om the MARS survey shows that migrant sending
households have a strong tendency towards inter-generation continuity.
Though more investigation is needed, evidence suggests that external
(and internal) migration is a deepening phenomenon. More than twothirds (67.1%) of the households interviewed had parents of migrants
who had previously worked abroad and 43.6% had grandpar ents of the
household head who were external migrant workers. The data suggests
that only about one-third of the households interviewed are first generation migrant-suppliers. Although we do not know what percentage of
22
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migrant households have ceased sending migrants, the rate of growth of
migrant-sending households is assumed to be positive. Generally, households with more than one generation of migration would have accumulated more wealth than households that have just started sending members to seek work either inside Mozambique or beyond.

HOUSEHOLD DIFFERENTIATION
his section focuses on evidence provided by the MARS survey
about household economic differentiation, including: expenditures; the need to borrow and sources of loans; perceptions
on the impact of migration; and, most importantly, an analysis
of poverty levels among external migrant-sending households.
Household expenditure estimates derived from the MARS sur vey are
at best indicative.16 Table 19 shows the frequency of the types of expenditures incurred in the previous month. Food was by far the most important (89.3%) followed by fuel (mainly wood and paraffin) (46.6%),
transportation (44.5%) and education (43.9%). Other important categories include utilities (of particular importance to urban households),
clothes, alcoholic drinks and medical expenses.
In terms of value spent, the largest average amounts were spent on
building activities (about US$ 150) although relatively few households
(13.4%) spent money on this category in the previous month. The second highest expenditure was on food (US$ 70) which was also the most
frequently cited expenditure. The third highest average value was for
special events (US$ 50) such as wedding and funerals followed by
clothing (US$ 55).
Food was by far the most dependent on remittances (77.5% claiming
that remittances were “very important”). Remittances were also considered to be “very important” for cattle purchases school fees; clothing,
transport costs; vehicle purchase and maintenance; informal sector trading and farm labour costs. Remittances were felt to be “important” to
the survival of the household in a significant majority of cases in relation to food (72.7%), medical treatment (63.6%) and for cash income
(74.9%) (table 64).
The relevance of these findings in relation to household differentiation is that expenditure on food and other basic needs overwhelmingly
dominates the budget of external migrant-sending households.
Comparatively few households (mainly those with miners and a handful
of others with members in higher income jobs) therefore have the
capacity to invest in housing, cattle or vehicles.
One of the more interesting findings to come out of the MARS
study relates to the borrowing patterns of the respondent households.

T
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Table 19: Monthly household expenses
Responses

% of households %of responses

Food and groceries

648

89.3

20.4

Housing

5

0.6

0.2

Utilities

291

40.1

9.1

Clothes

262

36.1

8.2

Alcohol

240

32.6

7.5

Medical expenses

229

31.5

7.2

Transportation

323

44.5

10.2

Cigarettes, tobacco, snuff

43

5.9

1.4

Education

319

43.9

10

Entertainment

15

2.1

0.5

Savings

84

11.7

2.6

Fuel

338

46.6

10.6

Farming

82

11.3

2.6

Building

97

13.4

3

Special events

80

11.0

2.5

Gifts

41

5.6

1.3

Other expenses

33

4.5

1

No expenses

8

1.1

0.3

Refused to answer question

43

5.9

1.4

Total

3181

100

Source: MARS

The need to borrow can be seen as an important indicator of vulnerability. A significant 41.7% of the households said that they borrowed
money during the last year. Of those borrowing, half borrowed from
family, 36.7% from friends and 2.3% from employers. The main reasons
for borrowing money were for the purchase of food (33.2%), health
(21.7%) and funerals (4.6%). Financing companies are hardly present
with the exception of a few microfinance operators (with almost no
presence in the rural areas and usually lending according to small business needs).
Loans are for the most par t used for “survival” issues i.e. food and
health. These are typical periodic needs of poor households, especially
for those who have to r ely on irregular remittances. A big advantage for
many remittance-receiving families is that they are probably seen as
lower risk for loans than subsistence households with less reliable cash
flows. Schooling and business loans are also quite common and are possibly linked to the household’s ability to repay.
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In terms of the effect on the household, if more household members
migrated for work, a significant minority (40.8%) felt that the household would be better off but a majority (59.2%) of the respondents were
less sanguine, feeling that there would either be no difference, they
would be worse off or they did not know. Although at face value we
cannot conclude very much from the r esponse to this question, it can
be inferred that the respondents must to some extent be weighing up
the negative effects of losing another member, suggesting that most
households have sent the maximum number of members possible without prejudicial effects on the domestic household economy.
Household economic differentiation can be best highlighted through
poverty analysis. A common poverty indicator takes the percentage of
food expenditures relative to overall expenditures. The MARS survey
found that the average percentage of expenditure devoted to food is
56.7%. “Relatively poor” households were defined as those spending
between 60-79% of their total expenditures on food and “extremely
poor” were spending between 80-100%. The results show that almost a
quarter (24.7%) of the households can be considered to be relatively
poor and slightly less (22.4%) as extremely poor. These findings should
be seen with caution for two reasons. The first is that many households
depend to a significant extent on self-produced household consumption
that is not measured in the above analysis. This would mean that food
“expenditure” is even higher than indicated and that the level of poverty is in fact worse than indicated. On the other hand, the proportion of
expenditures devoted to food may have been exaggerated given the fact
that most households were inter viewed the month following traditionally high consumption periods (Christmas/New Year).
Other indicators suggest a high level of poverty amongst a significant
portion of migrant-sending households. The MARS suvery found that
24.1% of the households are many times without food and 11.3% are
many times without medical car e. Although these households are very
dependent on cash income, 36.8% of the households claim to have
been many times without cash and 32.6% were several times without
cash.
Despite the difficulties associated with getting accurate figures relating to the poverty indicators, the data suggests that many of the external migrant sending households are indeed very poor. These findings
underscore what earlier work on Mozambique demonstrated i.e. that
there is a high degree of economic differentiation among migrant sending households ranging from the elite benefiting from several migrants
with relatively high mine wages or professional salaries to households
who are forced to send members to work under poor conditions for lack
of finding suitable employment in Mozambique.17
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CONCLUSION
he rural areas of Southern Mozambique (or the South) have
fewer resources and are agriculturally poorer and more vulnerable to climatic instability compared to the rural areas of the
Centre and North. Yet, as this study has demonstrated, the
pool of economic assets of the average rural household in the South is
far greater than for other regions. This disparity can be largely explained
by the phenomenon of wage migration. Although a significant number
of households in the South have migrant and commuter members working for wages in the domestic economy (mainly in the industrial
enclave of Maputo-Matola), the most significant flow of wage-seeking
labour has been and continues to be to South Africa.
Early migration may have been largely influenced by push factors
such as hut tax, chibalo labour (colonial system of forced labour),
drought, and famine. Later, however, employment in South Africa, particularly the mines, was the preferred income-generating choice of
Mozambican men from the rural (and often urban) South. Free transport, board and lodging and a virtually quarantined life, allowed miners
to accumulate most of their wages. Compulsory deferred pay ñ a system
of forced savings ñ further ensured that miners would return to their
homes with comparatively large amounts of money and goods. Such
remittances were generally used, at least initially, for improving the
household’s quality of life (through the construction or furnishing of
cement-walled homes, which soon became a reliable indicator of a
majonjon family residence. Remittances were also used for savings (normally in the form of livestock) or investment. Traditionally, one of the
most common investment choices was to buy a pickup (bakkie) for
transport purposes (often hired out) or a pump for irrigated agriculture.
Now, with the proliferation of vehicles in the rural areas and limited
irrigable areas, there is a greater tendency to invest remittances in informal sector trade activities undertaken by resident family members. For
many years, import duty exemptions for miners gave further accumulative advantages over other Mozambicans. Although no longer enjoying
such privileges, Mozambicans in South Africa can take advantage of
distribution services that provide reliable and cost-effective delivery of a
large variety of goods direct to their rural base.
Much of Souther n Mozambique’s external migration history took
place during periods when black workers, especially foreigners, were
subjected to the most exploitative of conditions. South Africa’s migration system was the economic modus operandi of the apartheid system.
Yet, despite the degradation and oppression of such work, Mozambican
men streamed into South Africa, usually offering a supply much greater

T
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than the absorption capacity of a mining industry wary of excessive
dependence on one source. Mine work still offered the best of the economic options for the majority of rural work seekers from the South and
allowed them to build up their rural home base but at considerable
social cost.
Mozambican miners may collectively be seen as a wage elite.
Households with several generations of miners are likely to have built
up assets and a home-based production capacity that would put them
well above the economic status of other households with a more recent
involvement in mine-migration. Households with miners with greater
skills, longer service or with mor e than one miner, may have relatively
high earnings. However, a significant proportion of miner-sending
households could be considered to be poor. Differentiation between
households is even more poignant when looked at across the entire
range of migrant-sending households. The picture becomes considerably
bleaker and suggests that there may be a significant proportion of
migrant-sending households that could be worse off because of migration than if the migrant members had stayed at home as the returns to
home-based labour might be larger than the contribution derived from
the migrant.
Despite Mozambique’s economic growth rate being one of the highest in Africa over the past few years, much of the growth is linked to
the development of highly capital intensive “mega” projects with limit ed absorption of unskilled workers. The urban informal sector which has
hitherto absorbed considerable numbers of the unemployed has become
less attractive for the rural labour surpluses as increasing competition
makes economic survival more difficult. Such limitations within the
domestic economy, recently exacerbated by the current drought in the
South, has forced many rural households to seek employment in South
Africa.
The recent agreement between Mozambique and South Africa to
abolish visas is an indication of the likely gradual relaxation on the
movement of Mozambican wage seekers in South Africa. With limited
income-generating opportunities, the implications of more
Mozambicans seeking work in South Africa could be greater labour supply and hence a higher likelihood of exploitation. Unlike the mines and
some other sectors, Mozambicans engaged in agricultural work or irregular employment are likely to find themselves facing conditions that
make regular home visits difficult and the accumulation of savings from
very low wages almost impossible. The prospect of a growing number of
rural households having to resort to this form of labour migration to
South Africa should cause alarm in terms of the Government’s current
focus on poverty reduction.
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Having demonstrated that the overall economic impact of migrant
labour has been positive in the South of Mozambique, this paper has
also attempted to show that, because the nature of migration has
changed so significantly over the last 15 years (i.e. the eclipsing of mine
migration and increasing numbers of young Mozambican men chasing a
limited number of jobs), it is likely that, in the coming years, the economic impact of migrant labour work in South Africa may diminish
quite substantially as the amounts of wages remitted are reduced (due to
lower earnings) and the mechanisms available for doing so are much
more limited than for miners and workers in other, more privileged,
wage sectors.
ANNEX 1. Wealth Point Determinants for ANE Survey
Determinant

Cohorts

Point Allocation

1. Size of Machamba (fileds)

< 1 ha

0

1-2ha

5

2-5ha

10

5 ha +

20

<200 (but greater than 0)

1

200-500

2

500-1,000

4

1-2,000

8

2-5,000

16

5-10,000

30

10,000-20,000

40

>20,000

50

Yes

10

No

0

Yes

10

No

0

Yes

10

No

0

Per goat owned

1

Per head of cattle

5

Don’t know but > 0

5

<200

5

200-500

10

500-1,000

20

>1,000

30

2. Value of crop (000 MT per annum)

3. Improved Seeds

4. Fertilizers

5. Pesticides

6. Livestock

7. Monthly wages (000 MT)
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Annex 1 continued
8. Monthly Non-Agricultural Income (000 MT)

9. Animals sold during past 12 months (000MT)

10. Investments (annual) (MT)

11. Housing materials

12. Other assets

Don’t know but >0

2

<50

2

50-100

4

100-200

8

200-500

16

>500

20

<200

1

200-500

2

500-1,000

4

1,000-2,000

8

2,000-5,000

16

5,000-10,000

30

10,000-20,000

40

>20,000

50

.5-1m

5

1-3m

10

3-5m

20

>5m

30

Cement block

40

Other

0

Cement/tiled floors

5

Other categories

0

Water piped in or out of
house/well in yard

10

Other categories

0

Electricity supplied

30

Electricity not supplied

0

Solar panel

5

Generator

5

Water pump

20

Grain mill

20

Plough

5

Refrigerator

5

Radio

2

Music system

3

Television

5

Video

5
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Annex 1 continued
Watch

1

Boat

15

Fishing net

3

Bicycle

3

Motor cycle

20

Pick up van

50

Car

50

Truck

80

Tractor

50

Water tank

3

Drums (200 lts)

1

Other large water containers

1

Cool box

1
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Refs to Harries, Katzenellebogen, Jeeves.
First et. al. (1998)
De Vletter in McDonald
Crush
The work was supervised by the author of this paper, so considerable emphasis was placed on aspects of labour migration, an issue that had not been adequately dealt with in most previous household surveys.
6 Data from this survey, in terms of the national currency (metical), has been
converted at the rate of 12,500MT = USD 1.
7 Data from this survey, using the national currency (metical), has been converted at the rate of 23,000MT = USD 1.
8 Footnote
9 No comparisons were made with the North as the number of households
with wage workers (73) was considered to be too small to be statistically
meaningful in comparison with 686 for the South and 982 for the Centre.
10 The term “external migrant” in this study has been applied to anyone who is
absent from the household and located in a foreign country for the purposes
of earning an income. Under this definition external migrants would include
informal traders (hawkers), many of whom go back an forth to neighbouring
countries to sell their goods in Mozambique. It also include self-employed
business persons, many of whom have informal activities.
11 Some 49.1% of the household population is considered to be adult (i.e. 20
years or older) 35.6% of HH population are adults with the categories house30
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12

13

14

15

16

17

hold heads, spouses, in laws, brothers, etc. This means that 13.5% of the
household population (832) are either sons/daughters, grandchildren or
nephews/nieces with an age of 20 or above. For simplicity’s sake we have
assumed they are all sons/daughters. Further assuming that half are male, we
get 416 adult sons. There are 557 sons/daughters who are migrants. There are
a total of 75 female migrants. Assuming all come from the son/daughter category, we are left with 482 sons who have migrated. From this we can assume
that almost all adult sons have migrated to SA and some daughters. It should
be noted that some migrants are likely to be less than 20 years old as 11.7%
of migrants are aged between 15-24.
During recent interviews with urban households in Maputo, the author was
struck by number of households who were not aware of the work their
migrant members were engaged with in South Africa.
Census data (1997) show household sizes of approximately 3.8 for the North,
4.5 for the Center and 4.6 for the South. These are consistent with the survey findings since the census includes individuals (i.e. one person households) which accounts for 10.3% of all households, while excluding migrants
that have been away for more than 6 months who would be included as residents by the survey respondents.
Although there are indeed stark differences between the regions, the wealth
point distribution is distorted by fact that self-consumed production is not
included. As seen in section 7, a poverty analysis based mainly on consumption finds that the Northern region is the best off and the South the worst.
Because cash income is a substitute for self-consumption for many households in the South and is relatively easily measured and incorporated in the
wealth point calculation, a more realistic depiction would show a downward
adjustment for the South and an upward one for the North and Centre.
This is likely to be seriously underestimated as many Mozambicans are
known to be hired (often illegally) on the farms, mainly in Mpumulanga
Province. It is likely that many agricultural workers were listed as “other” or
“unknown”.
It was optimistic to expect poorly educated respondents (many of whom were
not involved in the actual expenditures) to recall how much was spent on a
long list of possibilities over the previous month. The other influencing issue
is that many of the interviews took place in January just after the “festive
season” meaning that the “previous month” was December, during which an
inor dinate amount would have been spent on food and clothing. Other
inter views took place in February resulting in January being the previous
month during which very little expenditure of any sort would have taken
place.
First et al (1998)
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